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Abstract. This theoretical paper aims to critically discuss the extent of positivism in order for us to under-
stand the contemporary social world. The discussion concentrates on philosophical positivism from a social 
science standpoint, firstly, its origin and development during the eighteenth century, then secondly, the 
development of the Vienna Circle, and lastly, the influence of the late nineteenth century’s postmodernism 
has on positivism. Rather than focusing on the distinct recurrent anticipations of positivism of ancient ide-
ologies of philosophy, the paper describes the theoretical understandings of positivism in sociological per-
spective. Then it highlights the tenets of positivism developed by different sociologists and philosophers. 
Lastly, by probing into those tenets and methodological implications of different positivist approaches it 
critically analyses the extent to which this ideology aids our understanding of the concurrent social world. 
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1. Positivism and Science 
 
“Positivism, a short lived philosophy of social science that held facts could be rigidly 
separated from values and that analysis could be value free. The last positivist not in 
captivity died in 1970 from internal injuries incurred after discovering that holding facts 
in high regards meant that facts had value and thus could never be separated from val-
ues.” (Meier, 2005). 
 
This statement gives a clear indication that positivism is subjected to scrutiny from the 
advocates of interpretevism. Positivism was in target of criticism since the last century. It 
came under strong condemnation when many social science researchers started to gather 
under the banners of structuralism, hermeneutics and phenomenology (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg, 2009). Critics expressed concern that the idea of doing research by following 
a scientific model can lead to the dismissal of research as valuable tool in understanding 
the rich complexity of the social world. For them, the scientific approach which positiv-
ism espouses was inadequate when it comes to learning about how people understand 
the world and interact with its elements (Antonesa et al., 2006). Arguably, this crucial 
judgement is just one of the many which reflects the metamorphose nature of positivism. 
Positivism, being a philosophy of science had undergone a variety of inspection lenses 
by philosophers and sociologists since the eighteenth century. Though the root of posi-
tivism can be traced back among the ancient philosophers, the modern day positivism 
was developed by Comte in the eighteenth century (Bryant, 2013; Cohen, 2007; McIntosh, 
1997). Comte is regarded as the first philosopher of modern science for his pioneering 
classification of science and thus the concept of classical positivism is also mostly associ-
ated with him (SEP, 2013). However, the study of the social world consisting of social 
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phenomena was considered too complex by sociologists and philosophers, and positiv-
ism went under scrutiny throughout the twentieth century. Its ideology differed among 
researchers from a variety of standpoints. During the 1930s, the scientific study of society 
was confined to a collection of information about phenomena that can be objectively ob-
served and classified — a positivist philosophy provided by the Vienna Circle or logical 
positivism (Bryant, 2013; Hunt, 1991). Vienna Circle claimed that philosophy is a logical 
analysis of language and it rejected all metaphysical and poetic ways of explaining real-
ity, which includes social reality in favour of scientific method (Harrison and Atherton, 
2001; Cohen, 2007). It drove the idea that knowledge of the world can be justified only by 
experience and so individuals are never entitled to assert the existence  of  anything  be-
yond  all  possible  experiences  (Delanty,  2005;  McIntosh,  1997;  Hollis,  1994; Giddens, 
1974). Afterword, a significant volume of debate can also be found in appropriating phil-
osophical foundations for social research among the postmodernist researchers. Many 
writers attacked the classical positivism and Vienna Circle for studying the contemporary 
social world and offered alternative “ways of knowing” (Hunt, 1991). Naturalistic inquiry 
(Belk et al., 1989), humanistic inquiry (Hirschman, 1986), ethnographic  methods  (Sherry,  
1983),  relativism  and  constructionism  (Peter  and  Jerry,  1983),  critical relativism (An-
derson 1986), and critical realism (Edwards et al., 2014) were some of those suggested 
alternatives. 
 
Auguste Comte, the nineteenth-century French philosopher is generally considered as 
the mastermind of positivism. He considered that accounts of human cognitive and social 
life were languishing in the pre- scientific, metaphysical stage, when astronomy, physics, 
chemistry, and biology, all he argued, arrived at the scientific stage. So he thought the 
social sciences should also concentrate on scientific laws rather than assumption (Hasan, 
2014; Benton & Craib, 2001). He further stressed that science consisted of precise and cer-
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tain method, basing theoretical laws on sound empirical observation. For him, social sci-
ences were kin to natural sciences, sharing the same epistemological forms (Hughes and 
Sharrock, 1997, Acton, 1951). Comte’s positivism was based on some key features, such 
as reality consists in what is available to senses; philosophy, while a distinct discipline, is 
parasitic on the findings of science; the natural and human sciences share common logical 
and methodological principles; and there is a basic different between fact and value, sci-
ence deal with the fact and the value belongs to an entirely different order of discourse, 
which is beyond the remit of science (Hasan, 2014; Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). 
 
Since the 1950s, a variety of different standpoints put positivism in question in the study 
of natural and social sciences. For example, Delanty (2005) recognised positivism as a 
philosophy that argues for the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the 
social sciences and thereby presupposes the unity of the sciences. Raadschelders (2005) 
and Spicer (2005) commented that in the hierarchy of sciences the natural sciences are 
greater than the social sciences, and thus, social sciences should seek to emulate the nat-
ural sciences. But, this belief is completely opposed by Meier (2005). He argued that in 
the spectrum of mathematics, natural, and social, these three types of sciences, the pur-
pose of empirical research is the principle distinguishable factor. In the discussion of the 
latter two, the natural sciences have empirical components but no design element, that is, 
they seek to know ‘what is’, but the question ‘what ought to be’ is not considered relevant 
(Meier, 2005). On the other hand, social sciences are empirical and have a design compo-
nent. So, turning social science into natural science is considered by Meier (2005) as 
“…equivalent of using a hammer to fix a computer software”. So, Meier’s hierarchy of 
science has social sciences at the top and natural sciences below with the fact that social 
sciences are more interesting, more complex, and require a greater range of skills to be 
researched (Meier, 2005). 
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2. Features of Positivism 
 
Sociologists and philosopher argued about defining positivism differently and attempted 
to explain it in various broad terms. However, Delanty (2005), Elster (2007), McIntosh 
(1997), Hollis (1994) tried out summarising the main features of positivism as follows: 
Positivism believes in the unity of the scientific methods, and natural sciences are gener-
ally taken to be the model for all the sciences. Alongside, positivists naturalism entails 
reductionism, a correspondence theory between truths of science and the nature of real-
ity, and phenomenalism (Delanty, 2005). Positivistic science also follows empiricism — 
where progress is made from observation to verification by means of the experimental 
method. This notion of empirical facts are quantified and correlated in an attempt to gen-
erate universal statements or laws about the world (Edwards et al. 2014). In addition, 
positivists researchers classify the social world in an objective, and value-free way 
(Delanty, 2005; Ritzer, 1996). Truth is a verifiable and explanatory statement about an 
objectively existing reality. Therefore, positivists insist on a dualism of facts and values. 
Although, a basic understanding of positivism can be denoted from these features, 
providing a clear and concise definition of positivism is a hard work, since the ideology 
had been and continues to be used in a varied ways by philosophers and social science 
researchers. 
 
Scientific knowledge is different from all other kinds of human knowledge since it can be 
verified and so can be termed to be universally true (Turner et al., 2012).  Giddens (1995), 
Kolakowski (1972) described positivism as a philosophy which is concerned with the pos-
itive application of knowledge to assist human progress. This stands in contrast to spec-
ulative knowledge claims that lack any scientific or empirical import. Commonly, post-
modernist positivists are noted for their rejection of metaphysics, and support for positive 
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data of experience as the basis of all knowledge. Dominance of using quantitative meth-
ods and statistical data to classify the social world in an objective way can be found in 
positivist researchers (Elster, 2007; Giddens, 1995, Hollis, 1994). 
 
3. Society as a ‘Thing’ 
 
“There is no such thing as society” (Thatcher, 1987) 
  
Though this statement was made neither by any philosopher or social scientist nor from 
any philosophical standpoint, it gives an indication of people’s belief that society does 
not exist as a separate entity. In other words, it signifies that there are things and entities 
in the society which are observable and verifiable and cannot be studied separately with-
out their context, that means, society including its elements, people and their interpreta-
tion is a singular entity as a whole. 
 
“What makes something that thing and not something else?” (O’Mahony, 2012) 
 
Throughout the twentieth century the ideology of grasping society as a thing had been 
under the scrutiny of academics. Different philosophical school of thoughts inspected so-
ciety in different ways. Comte retained a firm belief that the discovery of the laws gov-
erning the operation of human societies should be used to reconstruct society (Turner et 
al. 2012). He later defined society into two categories: statics and dynamics, with the aim 
of creating a naturalistic science of society (Turner et al. 2012). Edwards et al. (2014) sim-
ilarly acknowledged that the societal entities which ultimately interact to cause the events 
people observe cannot be studied or understood in isolation from their environment. So-
ciety contains complex and unpredictable feedback  loops  that  prevent  history  being  
conceived  as  determined  or  predictable  (Thompson,  2003). Societal entities are things 
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which can be material or immaterial and are organised hierarchically in that they exist at 
different levels. So, a greater explanatory power is to be found in understanding how 
these different entities relate as part of a greater thing — which is ‘a society’ (Edwards et 
al. 2014; Bhaskar and Hartwig, 2010). Similarly, Sayer (2011) commented that entities are 
necessarily related and because of this they generate physical or social structures. This is 
an important proposition because it leads the argument to consider the ways in which 
different social entities are related to each other and how in social science the social world 
is actually constituted (Edwards et al. 2014). 
 
A prominent viewpoint in support of treating society as a thing is found in Durkheim’s 
ideology. After Comte, Durkheim clearly shared some important features of positivism 
in common with other concurrent positivists. He argued that, social facts are things be-
cause they are outside us, they are not product or creation of the present generation, they 
are given pre-existing condition for human agency and they cannot be known by intro-
spection or reflection (Durkheim, 1982; Thompson, 1982). This thought to treat social facts 
as things classified the social world in an objective way (Hollis, 1994; Bryant, 1985). Durk-
heim (1982) believed that laws of human behaviour can be discovered by the collection 
of objective facts about the social world in a statistical form and so humans have little or 
no choice about how they behave. Using this classification, Durkheim further made it 
possible to count sets of observable social facts to produce statistical data in his study of 
the suicide rate and the membership of different religions. In this study he found an ap-
parent correlation between a particular religion and a high suicide rate (Durkheim, 1970). 
This positive methodology entails looking for correlations between different social facts. 
Similarly, in search for causal connections, for example, many sociologists noted a corre-
lation between social and parenting factors affecting criminal offence rates (Stroud, 2008; 
Turner, 2007; Kiriakidis, 2006; Kolvin et al., 1988). These researchers established causal 
connections between two or more variables by multivariate analysis, and examined their 
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findings in a variety of social world contexts and thus attained a law of human behaviour. 
Similarly, Harrison and Atherton (2001) found the rarity of researchers who would de-
fend the idea that social reality is stable, irreversible and biologically determined and 
claimed that majority researchers would recognise that many entities and factors in the 
social world including power and status, are socially constructed and not the result of 
impersonal environmental forces. It is noteworthy that, after Comte, Durkheim was a 
prominent sociologist who shared most of Comte’s ideologies about positivism, but care-
fully rejected as bordering on metaphysical many of Comte’s pronouncements about the 
laws of the historical progress of knowledge. In that respect, Hughes and Sharrock (1997) 
highlights that Durkheim’s work builds a bridge between the nineteenth-century and the 
twentieth. 
 
4. Positivism and the Methodology of the Social World Study 
 
In the social and natural world dichotomy, a significant aspect of the social world is its 
contextualisation by people to understand how or why something happens. The social 
world is made up of human agents who consciously and unconsciously reflect and react 
to information, intervention, or circumstances in different ways. Here, people contextu-
alise in order to learn anything or to draw conclusions (Parkhurst, 2013; Delanty, 2005; 
McIntosh, 1997). Whereas, a natural world is comprised with cause and effect relation-
ship. People judge how to react based on past experiences, current demands, and other 
contextual factors. Here people typically control for context to understand mechanisms 
of effect (Parkhurst, 2013; Halfpenny, 1982). 
 
As a result of this, to study the social world, many positivists argued that sociologists 
should not be concerned with the internal meanings, motives, feelings and emotions of 
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individuals. To explain social reality, a researcher must use empirically verifiable state-
ments. This view is established by Cohen (2007), Elster (2007), Delanty (2005), Bryant 
(1985), who limited the world to empirical facts claiming that all things are observable 
and there can be no truth without observation. Hollis (1994) added that positivism ac-
cording to 
  
Weber’s naturalism lurked behind a methodology which signified the individual’s sub-
jective meaning, and Weber had an empiricist scepticism about social structures as real 
entities with causal powers. Marx’s positivism contemplated a dialectical process in his-
tory working through class struggles (Hollis, 1994). In contrast, Durkheim believed that 
laws of human behaviour can be discovered by the collection of objective facts about the 
social world in a statistical form with the condition of careful analysis of these facts and 
by repeated checking of findings in a series of contexts (Bryant, 2013). Since the mental 
states exist only in the individual’s consciousness, they cannot be observed and so they 
cannot be measured in any objective way (Durkheim, 1982). Society for Durkheim was a 
reality in itself and sociology was a realist and inductive science of social facts (Delanty, 
2005; Lukes, 1973). It may be argued that this idea of society is not the perfect one, but his 
ideology clearly becomes a milestone in the history of modern social sciences because of 
his attempt to legitimate a conception of the social science consistent with the prevailing 
image of the natural science. Even though Durkheim’s perception faced criticism, his em-
phasis on laws and casual explanation, objectivity, and rigorous method not only gives 
authority to his own substantive investigation but also serves as a foundation for many 
social research (Hasan, 2014; Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). 
 
On the other hand, Meier (2005) opposed the idea that positivism agrees with a realist 
commitment to an objective world that exists independently of researchers. Likewise 
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Meier (2005), the perception of non- existence of reality if things are not observable and 
quantifiable is rejected by a large number of social science researchers. These researchers 
claimed that social world phenomena can be accepted as criterion variables against which 
theories may be tested without denying the reality of individual interpretation and social 
construction (Harrison and Atherton, 2001; Henrickson and McKelvey, 2001; Jackson and 
Jeffers, 1989). A particular methodology consisting of a scientific model or philosophical 
approach may have very good capacity of identifying a specific problem and its solution. 
This does not mean that, that specific methodology will have the same inclination to in-
terpret the knowledge to different dimensions of the contemporary social world. Franklin 
and Ebdon (2005) clearly illustrated the different methodology and skill sets in the wheel 
of science versus the wheel of practice. Based on the ideology of Meier (2005), a researcher 
can accept the idea that research of the social world must be relevant to real world prob-
lems and still reject the idea that the research methodology should in any way determine 
the content of the empirical positivist philosophical agenda. For example, Smith’s (2003) 
framework showed that quantitative studies have rarely been able to link high test scores 
to high figure income, or low level of crime, or law abiding citizenship, or any other ben-
efit that education bestows. However, Levitt and Dubner (2005) pointed out that creative 
use of quantitative analysis can get beyond biases to reveal interesting information. 
 
Interestingly, Dilthey and some other scholars proposed that, there can be no science of 
the social world (Rudolph, 2011; Reid, 2001; Oman, 1979; Tapper, 1925). Dilthey's idea of 
Geisteswissenschaft, for instance, is explicitly directed against positivism and maintains 
the difference between natural philosophy and moral philosophy (Rudolph, 2011; Reid 
2001). In the contrary, according to Comte, this distinction is abolished by the existence 
of sociology and his ‘Law of Thee Stages’, and the unity of all sciences through the resto-
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ration of metaphysics (Turner et al. 2012). Mill also agreed to Comte and while recognis-
ing differences between natural and social sciences, he stood for the unity of the scientific 
method. For Mill, all explanations had the same logical structure and society can be ex-
plained by the laws governing nature (Delanty, 2005). Another interesting point of view 
about the methodology of the social science study can be found in Popper’s work. Sup-
porting the realm of metaphysics he refuted one of the beliefs of logical positivism. He 
explained that scientific theories can begin as metaphysical hunches because these theo-
ries cannot be logically reduced to elementary statements of experience, and these theo-
ries are not fully justifiable or verifiable, they are nevertheless testable (Popper, 2002). He 
proposed that scientific theories can be tested, by reasoning deductively from theories to 
observation statements, which he termed as ‘intersubjectively tested’ (Popper, 2002). In 
fact, without abandoning all aspects of positivism, Popper proposed the principle of fal-
sification or ‘trial and error’ theory and suggested that instead of induction, science 
should progress deductively through attempts to falsify the results of previous theories 
(Delanty, 2005). Kuhn, on the other hand, suggested a profound alternative of Popper’s 
theory.  Kuhn,  though  accepted  the  unity  of  the  scientific  method  of deduction, 
argued that there is no one methodology to interpret the social world. Science proceeds 
neither inductively nor by falsification, rather physical sciences would only have a para-
digm change ever several centuries or so, but the social sciences constantly shift from one 
paradigm to another (Kuhn, 2012). 
 
So, in this era of postmodernism, several positivist ideologies can be found to study the 
contemporary social world. In fact, there are many valid reasons for positivists to follow 
the natural sciences as a role model for research works in social sciences. Hasan (2014) 
eloquently discusses this and highlights that, positivism provides an enormous cultural 
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authority to social scientists, which were previously possessed only by the scientific ex-
perts who used to provide regular advice to government on difficult matters of technical 
policy-making, from food safety to building standards and so on. Positivist approaches 
enable social scientists to present their disciplines as sufficiently and rigorously as the 
scientific experts, which provide them the platform to make strong claims about the reli-
ability, objectivity, and usefulness of the knowledge they have to offer (Benton and Craib, 
2001). In concurrent time, policy-makers consider social research as an important source 
of knowledge and in most countries official statistics are collected on virtually all aspects 
of social and economic life – on patterns of ill-health, diseases, epidemics and death, on 
marriage, separation and divorce, on unemployment, income differentials, attitudes and 
values, consumer consumption patterns and so on. Social scientists are employed to an-
alyse and interpret these vast amounts of information as well as to give advice on policy 
implications (Fischer, 2005; Benton & Craib 2001). 
 
On a different note, some positivists are concerned with the positive application of 
knowledge to assist progress and rejects rationalism while remaining naturalistic (Gid-
dens, 1995; Kolakowski, 1972). In contrast, another group of positivists also stresses on 
observation and they neither entirely rule social facts out nor do they flatly disallow the 
psychological observation of mental states. Furthermore, positivism embraces any ap-
proach which applies scientific method to human affairs conceived as belonging to a nat-
ural order open to objective enquiry (Hollis, 1994). However, considering all these differ-
ent positivist approaches, the strictest methodology to study the social world is to reject 
all psychological data and the qualitative method of research and to rely solely on objec-
tively existing facts and observation of those facts. Nonetheless, in a broader approach, 
positivism goes with an empiricism about scientific knowledge which rests on observa-
tion as the moment of truth when hypotheses are tested against the facts of the world 





This paper has attempted to explain the extent of positivism to aid our understanding of 
the contemporary social world. Although the history of positivism in social science re-
search is complicated and it is hard to discuss all arguments that support or oppose this 
approach in understanding the modern social world, the immense contribution of posi-
tivist researchers to study the social world cannot be denied by any means. Philosophers 
and sociologists have attempted to support or scrutinise positivism throughout the nine-
teenth and twentieth century with their own ideologies and logic, for example, starting 
with Comte, Durkheim, and Spencer as the prime advocates of positivism, then followed 
by Weber, Popper and Kuhn - as the critics of earlier positivism, and then in modern 
times Gadamer with this support for hermeneutics and Bhaskar for his critical realism, 
and by many others. Many of their ontological views are isomorphic, yet, a considerable 
level of ontological differences can also be found among the researchers, which resulted 
in an epistemological and methodological difference in the scientific research arena. 
Therefore, positivism has been dominated by critical realists, social constructionist, inter-
pretivist, and other postmodernist philosophies in recent decades. Which philosophical 
approach is the best to study the social world? To answer this Hunt’s prognosis can be 
offered here. Hunt (1991) predicted that a rapprochement between positivism and post-
modernism will be possible, as positivists could effect a rapprochement between com-
munities as diverse as science and philosophy at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
Cannot that be repeated at the century’s close? The following two statements may give 
the thinkers a new line of argument to be carried out: 
 
228                                                       Journal of Studies in Social Sciences 
“Sociology had its birth in the great philosophical doctrines, it has retained the habit of 
relying on some philosophical system and thus had been continuously overburden with 
it. It has been successively positivistic, evolutionary, idealistic, when it could be simply 
sociology!” (McIntosh, 1997: 208-209) 
 
“If truth tellers in the 1980s could destroy political walls so tall and thick, that many be-
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